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Supreme Court Review
F. EVIDENCE
Wright, McDermott and Feeley v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 539.
Regina v. Feeley, Wright, McDermott
Notwithstanding the sometimes sinister and always newsworthy
circumstances surrounding this case, the points of law involved merit
consideration and discussion.
The accused were charged on two counts of conspiracy involving
alleged bribes to a police officer for the purpose of receiving advance
warnings of anti-gambling raids. W was also charged in three addi-
tional counts with having committed substantive offences under s.
101 (b) of the Criminal Code,1 these arising from the payments alleged
to have been made by W to the police officer.
At the first trial Spence J., presiding, the Crown elected to pro-
ceed on only the first conspiracy count. The necessary three elements
of the offence the Crown sought to prove were: (1) conspiring to-
gether to commit an indictable offence under s. 101 (b) of the Criminal
Code; (2) corruptly giving money to the police officer; and (3) in-
tending that the officer should interfere with the administration of
justice contrary to s. 408(1) (d) of the Criminal Code. The result of
jury deliberation was the acquittal of the accused.
Count two upon which the Crown next proceeded before Don-
nelly J., differed from count one since it involved neither the corrupt
payment of money to the police officer, nor the intent that he should
interfere with the administration of justice as elements. The Crown
had now to prove only a conspiracy to obtain from the officer informa-
tion which it was his duty not to divulge. The latter element did not
necessarily involve on the part of the conspirators an intent to inter-
fere with the administration of justice.2
At trial the accused put forward the special plea of autrefois
acquit as well as the alternative of res judicata but both were rejected
by Donnelly J. However, insofar as the three substantive charges
against W were concerned, the trial judge accepted the defence of
res judicata and directed an acquittal.
The decisions of Donnelly J. regarding autrefois acquit and res
judicata were appealed by the accused as was the acquittal of W
on the three counts by the Crown. All these questions were decided
unfavourably to the accused by the Court of Appeal.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Judson J. delivered the majority
decision affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeal.
All members of the Court concur with Judson J. in rejecting the
plea of autrefois acquit. All adopt the reasons of Schroeder J.A., to
the effect that the two charges are essentially different, since their
11953-54 (Can.), c. 51.2 Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298; R.R.O. 1960, Reg. 486.
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elements are not identical. The test applied by the court in judging
the merit of the special plea is that of comparing the elements of the
two charges rather than examining the similarity of evidence and
fact in the two trials.
In attempting to meet the difficult onus of establishing the validity
of a plea of res judicata, the defence arguments at trial centred on
admissions made by the accused during the first trial. The accused
had admitted all elements of count one, except the intent to inter-
fere with the administration of justice. Thus, ran the defence argu-
ment, the jury in acquitting the accused must have decided the matter
of intention in the favour of the accused. Because of the previous
settlement of this vital issue of fact common to both offences, the
defence reasoned that the trial judge should direct a verdict of not
guilty.
Judson J., in denying the defence of res Judicata in this case
and the validity of the above defence logic, says at page 568 of his
judgment:
An acquittal on a charge of conspiracy does not pronounce against every
part of it
The Court follows the reasoning of Schroeder J.A., who could
see no certainty as to the basis of the jury's decision despite the re-
duction of its area of decision by the admissions of the accused. His
Lordship reasoned that lack of proof of a common objective among
the alleged conspirators or intent on the part of W alone are two of
several possible reasons for the jury's verdict.
Hall J., in his dissenting judgment makes clear his feeling that
his colleagues have erred in focusing their attention on the wording
of the two charges. While he accepts this as the proper method in
deciding upon the plea of autrefois acquit, he considers that in apply-
ing a very similar mode of analysis to the problem of res judicata,
the majority recognized easily apparent elemental differences between
the two crimes. To Hall J., and Cartwright J., who concurs in the
dissent, the differences between the two proceedings are largely
illusory.
The only important question, in the opinion of Hall J., is were
there two conspiracies or only one? Using the transcripts of the two
trials as his reference text, he compares the various components of
the trials and finds many strong arguments for the validity of the
"one-conspiracy" position.
For instance, the only sizeable difference between the evidence
given at the first and second trials is that some has been excluded
in the second. He questions the logic of the proposition that a separate
offence can be created by a process of severing the first.
The police officer who was W's contact gave evidence at each
trial which painted an unmistakeably clear picture of one indivisible
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conspiracy with only one intent. The only agreement the officer and
W ever had was to pass information regarding future raids.
A comparison of opening statements by the Crown in each case
displays no appreciable difference in the elements of the crime dealt
with. The charges to the juries of the respective judges again do not
conflict enough to warrant a conclusion that either saw the case as
a particularly different or separate one.
Hall J. comes to the conclusion that everything unlawful in
count two was part and parcel of the agreement covered by count one;
consequently, his decision is that res judicata has been established
and the convictions should therefore be quashed.
Regarding the three additional counts against W, the majority
held that the jury's verdict had merely acquitted him of conspiracy
and in no way could the verdict be construed to absolve him from
having committed the substantive offences himself.
Hall J. agrees that the Crown is not estopped from bringing
the charges because of the conspiracy count. However he echoes
the position of Donnelly J., at trial and would hold that res judicata
necessitates a finding of not guilty by reason of the jury's conclusion
on the one issue it had before it at the first trial.
Cartwright J., in a short dissent quotes from a unanimous judg-
ment written by Douglas J., of the United States Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Sealfon.3 His purpose is to display a reasonable approach in
deciding the question of a defence of res judicata in conspiracy cases.
In deciding if there has been a determination of facts favourable to
the present defendant, Douglas J. advises the consideration of "...
the facts adduced at each trial and the instructions under which the
jury arrived at its verdict at the first trial." Douglas J. goes on to
advise the consideration of the whole set of circumstances of the
proceedings for hints valuable in the search for the issues decided
by the jury.
It is true that a blanket verdict of guilty or not guilty is not
weighty authority for the proposition that one of the issues before
the jury has been decided one way or another. However, there are
cases in which logic and the final balance of all probabilities indicate
with reasonable certainty the jury's settlement of a matter of fact.
In the case under consideration the Supreme Court of Canada had an
excellent opportunity to apply a process such as that outlined in the
judgment of Douglas J.
The Court's reluctance to accept any but the most certain of
proofs of a jury's decision on a particular issue is not without serious
implications. It would seem to follow that the defence of res judicata
is now of little usefulness where the prior decision relied upon was a
criminal one with its customary blanket verdict. Perhaps only in such
3 (1948), 332 U.S. 575.
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clear cut situations as where identity is the issue common to the two
trials, will res judicata retain its usefulness in protecting defendants
from double exposure to the deliberations of their peers.
The majority's determination of the broad question of whether
there were two conspiracies or only one is equally ominous. In such
a decidedly factual question, the formalistic approach of the court
in fixing largely upon the wording of the charges is not the most
fruitful approach.
In view of the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada in this case there is now considerable doubt as to the avail-
ability of the defence of res judicata in cases which involve criminal
conspiracy.
P.G.J.
Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co., [1963] S.C.R. 154.
Hanes v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company,' a Supreme
Court of Canada decision, decided that the standard of proof applic-
able in a civil case where it is necessary to prove a criminal act is the
balance of probabilities test rather than the more stringent test in
criminal proceedings proper of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The double standard of proof for civil and criminal cases, estab-
lished in the nineteenth century, has been the subject of unclear
consideration by the courts, much discussion and much criticism. 2
The respondent insurance company brought this action against
the appellant Hanes, pursuant to the provisions of The Insurance Act,
Ontario, for reimbursement of $22,174.85 paid by it towards satis-
faction of a judgment against the appellant. The appellant was insured
by the respondent under a standard automobile insurance policy and
was the unsuccessful litigant in an action arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. The respondent alleged that the sum paid was one
which it would not have been liable to pay except for the provisions
of s. 214(1) and (3) (ii) of the Insurance Act because the appellant
at the time of the accident was "under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to such an extent as to be for the time being incapable of the
proper control of the automobile" within the meaning of the prohibi-
tion in statutory condition 2(1) (a) of the policy.
The trial judge thought that on the reasonable balance of proba-
bilities the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to the extent specified in condition 2(1) (a) but he was also of the
opinion that he was bound to be satisfied "beyond reasonable doubt"
1 [19631 S.C.R. 154.
2 G. H. L. Fridman, Standards of Proof, (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 665. As a
result of the instant case there is more certainty as to standards of proof, but
the definition of the standards may still give rise to confusion.
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